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French Canadian Participation 
in the War of 1812 
A Social Study of the 
Voltigeurs Canadiens 
Martin F. Auger 
D uring the War of 1812, the participation of French Canadians in colonial militia units 
such as the Voltigeurs Canadiens was of great 
importance for the defence of Lower Canada. The 
colony's lack of regular British troops combined 
with the threats of American invasion rendered 
crucial the mobilization of the local populace, 
most of which was of French descent. Although 
lacking the discipline and structure of British 
regular soldiers. Lower-Canadian militiamen 
were able to neutralize numerous American 
invasion attempts. Altogether, this impressive 
participation in the war effort helped redefine 
the military character of French Canadians. It 
also dissipated the British authorities' fears that 
French Canadians were disloyal subjects. This 
study analyses the military organization of the 
Voltigeurs Canadiens to demonstrate the 
importance of French Canadian participation in 
the war, especially in Lower Canada, their 
military campaigns and how the Voltigeurs' 
victories became the pride of all French Canada. 
In the early 19th Century, the defence of 
British North America relied on regular soldiers, 
provincial/ colonial (fencibles) soldiers, 
militiamen and native Indians. The British 
regular army was the backbone of this 
apparatus. However, with the advent of the 
French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) and the 
Napoleonic Wars ( 1803-1815 ), Britain kept most 
of its regular troops in Europe. As a result, the 
British North American colonies were neglected 
despite the American threat. By 1812, the 
situation became problematic as there were only 
9,000 British regulars garrisoned in the whole 
of North America, of which 4,400 garrisoned 
Lower Canada. This was a very moderate force, 
considering that Lower Canada was the 
economic and political centre of British North 
America. 1 
Because of the lack of regular soldiers, 
provincial/ colonial regiments, commonly known 
as fencibles, were raised for local defence among 
the local population in each of Britain's North 
American colonies as early as 1793. The 
structure and organization of fencibles closely 
resembled that of British regular regiments, and 
they were subjected to the same laws, regulations 
and conditions of service as regular units. With 
fencible regiments, it was felt that each British 
North American colony had some capacity to 
defend itself, but there were never enough. For 
example, in 1812, there were only 700 men in 
the Canadian Fencibles, a regiment recruited 
among the Lower-Canadian population. 2 
Although the colonial authorities were well 
aware of the shortage of regular troops in Lower 
Canada, they knew they could not depend on 
reinforcements while Britain was at war with 
France. Their only alternative was to arm the 
local population through the institution known 
as the militia. 3 The fact was that every British 
subject was a potential militiaman who could 
be called upon to defend his country or colony 
in times of crisis. 4 With an average population 
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of 270,000 habitants in 1812, Lower Canada 
was a perfect reservoir for the militia.5 However, 
the problem was that this colony was not like 
any other. The vast majority of its population 
(90 per cent) was of French origin. With Great 
Britain at war with France, the British authorities 
were fearful of their French Canadian subjects' 
loyalty. Nobody knew how they would react in 
the advent of war. 6 
As war with the United States seemed more 
and more imminent, the Lower-Canadian 
Legislative Assembly, in consultation with 
Governor-General Sir George Prevost, 
authorized the mobilization of the militia in April 
1812. 7 Overall, more than 60,000 militiamen 
could be mobilized in Lower Canada8 organized 
in three categories; Sedentary Militia, Select 
Embodied Militia, and Corps ofVolunteers. 9 
The Sedentary Militia was the basis of this 
system. As the 1803 Militia Act stipulated, every 
able man aged between 16 and 50 was 
automatically part of this body. Every April these 
men registered for a week-end of military 
training, which often ended in taverns. Each 
Lower-Canadian parish was organized as a 
company of the Sedentary Militia. The purpose 
of this system was to make sure every colonial 
subject was ready to defend his "homeland." In 
most cases, these militiamen did Corvee work, 
supplying front line troops with provisions and 
equipment. Hence, when the war scare of 1812 
emerged, these were the first units the Assembly 
mobilized. 10 
The Legislative Assembly also imposed 
conscription in order to levy four battalions of 
what came to be called the Lower Canada Select 
Embodied Militia. In May 1812, 2,000bachelors 
aged between 18 and 30 were drafted for a 
minimum service period of 90 days and a 
maximum of two years. Chosen by ballot among 
the Sedentary Militia, the battalions of the Select 
Embodied Militia acted as front line units and 
were mobilized along the American border.U 
Eventually, new battalions were created to 
counter the American menace which existed in 
the border regions. Every year, Sedentary Militia 
divisions each had to conscript men within their 
ranks for service in the Select Embodied Militia. 
Overall, eight battalions were raised between 
1812 and 1814. 12 
24 
Finally, the government created a volunteer 
corps. Although similar in organization to 
regular regiments, such outfits were made up of 
volunteers who agreed to serve for the duration 
of the war. Among such outfits was the Voltigeurs 
Canadiens. Acting as front line units, these 
corps were posted along the American border. 13 
The structure of such regiments will be 
addressed in the subsequent pages as we analyze 
the organization of the Voltigeurs. 
The defence of British North America also 
depended on native Indian allies. In charge of 
this force was the British Indian Department. 
Its task was to ensure that good relations 
prevailed between the Indian nations and the 
British authorities in North America. On the 
other hand, its military role was to secure the 
Indians' alliance in the advent of war with the 
United States. 14 This was done by supplying the 
aboriginals with numerous gifts. Because natives 
hoped for "homelands" to be returned to them 
in America if the British were successful, they 
supported the war in Canada. As a result, the 
Department raised numerous Indian companies 
to be used as military auxiliaries during the War 
of 1812. In Lower Canada alone, 770 Indian 
warriors were mobilized. 15 
All military forces in British North America 
were under the command of Governor-General 
Sir George Prevost. Appointed on 13 September 
1811, 16 Prevost never got complete jurisdiction 
over military decision making. Although 
commander-in-chief, he constantly received 
orders from British Prime Minister Lord Robert 
Liverpool; British Secretary of War Lord Henry 
Bathurst; and Britain's Commander-in-Chief, the 
Duke ofYork. 17 The Adjutant General of Lower 
Canada's militia was Fran<;ois Vassal de Monviel, 
who monitored all the militia units including the 
Voltigeurs. 18 
The Voltigeurs were created a few days after 
the mobilization of the militia had been ordered 
by the colony's Legislative Assembly. The idea 
for raising such a military outfit was proposed 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles-Michel 
d'Irumberry de Salaberry to Governor-General 
Prevost on 13 April1812. 19 The levy of this corps 
was immediately authorized by the governor on 
15 April. 20 Although most of the conditions in 
de Salaberry's proposal were approved, Prevost 
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made a few changes. For instance, de Salaberry 
hoped to raise a "Corps of eclaireur or rifle." 
His goal seemed to be a highly mobile outfit, 
specialized in skirmishing and scouting 
operations. As he indicated, "the use of Indians 
would be necessary for the role and purpose of 
this unit." Such a clause did not suggest the 
establishment of a typical infantry regiment, for 
Indian integration would not have been that 
crucial. 21 Prevost 
responded by approving 
a "Volunteer Provincial 
Corps of Light Infantry." 
This meant a unit whose 
organization and 
function was similar to 
that of the fencibles or 
other infantry regiments. 
Since Indians need not 
be integrated into such 
regiments, Prevost only 
attached 60 aboriginal 
warriors "armed, 
clothed after their own 
manner" to the unit. 
This was probably less 
than de Salaberry 
originally expected. 
Nonetheless, the new 
corps was given the 
name Voltigeurs 
Canadiens and began to 
mobilize. 22 
To command the 
corps, Governor Prevost 
appointed de Salaberry 
whom he found 
"adequately qualified to 
command that force 
because he has the 
influence and necessary 
energy to rise such a 
corps."23 However, the 
main reason probably 
was de Salaberry's great 
reputation as a military 
officer. Although a 
French Canadian, de 
Salaberry had served 
since 1793 with the 
British 60th Regiment of 
Foot ("The Royal 
Americans") in Britain, 
Canada, Holland and the West Indies. 24 His 
career in the regular army ended when he was 
promoted Lieutenant -Colonel of the Militia of the 
Province of Lower Canada by Prevost on 1 April 
1812. 25 Just 33 years of age, de Salaberry was a 
perfect candidate to command the newly-created 
Voltigeurs. His 19 years of military experience, 
acquired on the battlefields of Europe and the 
Antilles also made him aware of the most recent 
tactic. 26 
Although the Voltigeurs 
Canadiens were to be 
organized like a regular 
regiment, they were not 
part of the British 
regular army 
establishment. Like 
other militia corps of 
volunteers, they had 
been "raised to counter 
the apprehension of war 
with the United States or 
actual war." This meant 
that once the American 
threat was eliminated, 
the unit was to be 
disbanded. 27 Further, the 
unit was to "serve under 
the Provincial Militia 
Law of Lower Canada, 
and to be guided by the 
Rules and Regulations 
therein laid down for the 
good government of the 
militia." Also, the bare 
fact that Voltigeurs 
officers were to be 
"ranked junior to all 
officers of their 
respective ranks in the 
line of fencibles" 
demonstrated that the 
unit was not a regular 
regiment. 28 Moreover, 
the unit was given a 
Private, Canadian Voltigeurs, 
1813. Reconstitution by G. 
Embleton. The men's uniform 
was grey faced with black. 
The headdress was a visored 
light bearskin cap. 
Chateauguay Battlefield 
National Historic Site, Parks 
Canada 
25 
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Lieutenant John Hebden, Adjutant of the Canadian Voltigeurs, c.1814-
1815. The officers had a hussar-style dark green uniform trimmed with 
black. Print after a portrait. 
uniform distinct from that of regular regiments 
and well in keeping with its light infantry 
designation. Voltigeurs were given a uniform of 
"grey with black collar and cuffs and black 
buttons, with Canadian short boots and light 
bear skin caps. "29 Officers wore a distinct 
clothing green hussar-type uniform with black 
boots and the bear skin cap unique to the unit. 
The separate uniform worn by Voltigeurs 
soldiers helped develop a regimental identity and 
an esprit de corps. 30 
In order to appreciate the value of French 
Canadian participation in the War of 1812, it is 
essential to understand the importance of 
recruitment in the organizational structure of 
the Voltigeurs. Although the recruiting of officers 
was done somewhat differently from that of 
ordinary soldiers, the purpose of recruitment 
was still the same: persuade civilians to enlist 
in the military. As a force of volunteers, the 
Voltigeurs were very dependent on effective 
recruiting, and this was not easy to accomplish.31 
26 
Recruiting for the Voltigeurs began on 16 
April 1812. According to the Conditions for 
Raising a Corps of Light Infantry (Canadian 
Voltigeurs), issued by Governor-General Prevost 
on 15 April1812, the unit was to consist of: 32 
1 Major, Commandant 
6 Captains 
18 Lieutenants 
1 Adjutant 
1 Paymaster 
1 Quartermaster 
1 Surgeon 
1 Sergeant Major 
1 Quartermaster Sergeant 
1 Paymaster Sergeant 
1 Sergeant Armourer 
1 Bugle Major 
25 Sergeants 
25 Corporals 
10 Buglers 
4 75 Privates 
Aside from the Sergeants, Corporals and Buglers 
(Non-Commissioned Officers) and the Privates 
(soldiers) on the above list, 34 officers were 
needed. Historians Michelle Guitard and Luc 
Lepine have found that 54 officers actually 
served with the Voltigeurs during the War of 
1812.33 Officer recruitment for the unit was done 
by both Charles de Salaberry and Fran<;ois 
Vassal de Monviel. 34 Their recruiting methods 
were quite common for the time. Individuals who 
wished to become officers had "to contact some 
well placed person who could recommend him 
to Charles-Michel de Salaberry."35 Officers would 
then be appointed on the understanding that 
they would not receive their commission until 
they had enlisted a specific quota of men. In that 
sense, Voltigeurs officers acted as recruiting 
agents among the Lower-Canadian population. 
For instance, to obtain a captain's commission, 
an officer had to recruit 36 militiamen. To 
become a lieutenant, the candidate had to enroll 
16 soldiers while an adjutant only had to recruit 
11.36 This system enabled only the serious 
candidates to become officers in the unit. 
However, this system did not please all 
potential candidates. Recruiting men was a hard 
task. Although bounties were offered, as we will 
see, officers often had to attract civilians by 
offering more money. As a result, officers often 
had to draw from their own pockets to grant 
such "bonuses." Further, officers had to feed and 
lodge recruits until they arrived in camp. 
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Therefore, many candidates refused officer 
positions. 37 For example, when 14 Sedentary 
Militia officers were approached for lieutenant 
positions in the unit in 1812, only four accepted. 
Altogether, 12 out of 21 candidates refused 
commissions in the outfit. Hence, no enthusiasm 
was demonstrated for commissions in the 
Voltigeurs. This proved that establishing a good 
and loyal officer cadre was not an easy task. 38 
To become an officer in the Voltigeurs, one 
had to be a Canadian-born subject or detached 
from a regular unit. 39 Also, officers were to be 
"selected from the most respectable family of the 
province and to be nominated by the major 
commandant, subject to the approval of the 
Governor-General."40 This was not an unusual 
phenomenon. It was customary procedure to 
recruit militia officers among the leading classes 
of colonial society. Since such groups were 
already in positions of social power, it was felt 
to be only normal that they be given control of 
officer positions in the militia. The aim was to 
exploit the influence such individuals were 
presumed to have in the social hierarchy and 
extend it to the militia. The authorities felt 
comfortable when the militia, especially the 
Sedentary Militia, was led by officers who had 
influences in their communities. Furthermore, 
by granting officer positions to nobles, {g 
ro 
merchants, bourgeois or professionals, the ai 
colonial authorities felt they secured the loyalties 0 
per cent), as opposed to Fernand Ouellet's notion 
that the great majority of militia officers were 
either nobles, merchants or professionals. 42 
Although the social elite probably held stronger 
positions in the militia, the core of the officers 
was made up of ordinary citizens. 
Although officers tended to come from 
different social stratas, most of them lacked a 
crucial characteristic in times of war: military 
experience. When war came in 1812, military 
outfits began to seek officers with military 
background. 43 This proved a hard task since the 
colony had not been at war since the American 
Revolution ( 177 4-1783). Hence, finding veterans 
or individuals with military experience was 
almost impossible. 44 
Nonetheless, unlike most militia units. the 
Voltigeurs recruited a good proportion of men 
with military experience. Mter having retraced 
the socio-professional background of the 54 
Voltigeurs officers, Luc Lepine found that 15 of 
them had military experience (28 per cent). Of 
these officers, 9 were English, 5 were French 
Canadians and 1 was Swiss. This truly proved 
that the majority of anglo phone officers in that 
corps had military experience. Since the 
~ 
of the social elite. For many officers, militia &_ 
positions also became tools of social i 
promotion. 41 Ui 
Q 
E However, the pressures of warfare changed "' 
:C this dichotomy. As the War of 1812 progressed ""iii 
and more militia officers were needed, the § 
colonial government began to draw officers from ~ 
other parts of life. Historian Luc Lepine showed ~ 
this transformation when he analyzed the socio- 'E3 
professional background of the 2,695 militia ~ 
officers in Lower Canada during the War of 1812. in' 
Lepine found that 1,337 ofthem were farmers, ~ 
462 remained unknown, 282 were merchants, ]l 
210 were rural non-farmers, 178 were ~ () 
professionals, 153 were Seigneurs, 59 were in 
the military, 10 were craftsmen, and 5 were 
chaplains. His conclusion was that the majority 
of militia officers were ordinary farmers (49.6 
Recruiting party of the Canadian Voltigeurs, c. 1812-1813. 
Officers had to recruit their quotas of men in order to be 
confirmed in their commissions. As in the days of New 
France, much public business was done on the steps of a 
town's church steps in Quebec. Here we see an officer 
exhorting the virtues of military life in his company. 
Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
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Voltigeurs were to act as a front line unit, the 
authorities felt it necessary to grant officer 
commissions to candidates with military 
experience. In some cases, officers from British 
regular regiments even asked for commissions 
in the Voltigeurs. This probably had to do with 
de Salaberry's reputation and the colonial 
government's intention to have this regiment led 
by a cadre of experienced officers. 45 
When we examine the proportion of English-
speaking officers in relation to the French-
speaking ones, the overrepresentation of the 
English in the Voltigeurs is striking. Luc Lepine 
found that although the anglophones constituted 
less than 10 per cent of the Lower-Canadian 
population, 22.5 per cent of them were officers 
in the militia. In fact, of the 2,695 Lower-
Canadian officers, 607 were English. This 
disproportion was even more evident in the 
Voltigeurs. Of the 53 officers which served with 
the corps during the war, 26 were anglophones 
and 27 were francophones. Hence, 50 per cent 
of the Voltigeurs officer corps was English-
speaking.46 Therefore, we can clearly see that 
the Voltigeurs officer corps was unique in Lower 
Canada's militia since its proportion of 
Anglophones and career officers was much 
higher than in any other unit. In that sense, the 
VoUigeurs resembled regular infantry regiments 
much more than militia units. 
To attract Lower Canadians to the rank and 
file of the Voltigeurs, Governor Prevost relied 
on certain incentives, especially to attract French 
Canadians. 47 The recruiting campaign began in 
April1812 when the colonial authorities started 
to offer bounties of re4, later raised to re5, 48 to 
attract volunteers in the Voltigeurs. Authorities 
also offered Voltigeurs recruits other benefits 
such as the same salary as regular troops, and 
men enrolled in the corps were exempt from 
Militia Ballot during their service. 49 Thus, 
soldiers registered in the Voltigeurs were not to 
be conscripted for the Select and Embodied 
Militia, unlike the men of the Sedentary Militia. 50 
As of May 1812, the Voltigeurs began to 
publish public advertisements to seek out 
recruits with the emphasis on bounties. 
However, as the war progressed, the colonial 
authorities adopted a new tactic. Using 
newspapers, they attacked the honour and 
sensibilities of French Canadians, describing 
28 
them as a passive, un-military and lazy people. 
The aim was to prime French Canadians to 
avenge such unrealistic statements. 51 When the 
Quebec Mercury wrote that French Canadians 
were a bunch of military degenerates, the Lower-
Canadian population responded just as the 
government hoped it would. Historian Fernand 
Ouellet well described the emotion behind such 
accusations: "Ces accusations, portees 
publiquement ou non, avaient vivement emu, si 
ce n'est la masse, du mains l'elite. La guerre 
apparait-elle a plusieurs comme une occasion 
unique d'infliger un eclatant dementi a ces 
jugements prematures. "52 
The Catholic Church also played an 
important role in recruiting men in the parishes. 
Since militiamen were needed, the clergy acted 
as some sort of recruiting agency. Priests, in their 
sermons, incited their parishioners to enlist by 
emphasizing the honor and pride in being a 
French Canadian, greatfullness for the British 
Crown's paternalism, and respect of religious 
obligations, which ordered absolute obedience 
to the King. 53 Priests further incited parishioners 
by emphasizing that an American invasion of the 
colony would mean the end of Catholicism in 
Lower Canada. 54 As the war progressed, public 
prayers for the men on the front lines also served 
as a reminder that the war was still raging and 
that men were needed for the defence. 55 
However, despite such propaganda, the 
recruitment of troops for the Voltigeurs was not 
a rapid and easy process. Although de Salaberry 
counted on the popularity of his officers to 
accelerate recruitment, this did not materialize. 
To fill their quotas, officers had to roam cities 
and parishes seeking recruits who met the 
minimum requirements: Canadian-born, aged 
between 17 and 35 and no less than 5' 3" 
(160 em) in height.56 Plenty of men met the 
standards, but getting them to enlist often took 
a lot of time and effort. 57 Also, some officers 
tended to be lazy in recruitment. For instance, 
during the entire month of January 1813, only 
10 men were recruited by a Voltigeurs officer in 
Quebec City. De Salaberry even told his father; 
"It is a great misfortune to have officers, who 
care for nothing but their pleasures. ''58 
As a result of these problems, the corps was 
very slow to reach its authorized strength of 
50059 so Prevost reduced this to 350 in early 
6
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Canadian Voltigeurs training, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
June 1812.60 Later that month, the strength of 
the unit was limited to 300 men. The main 
reason for such reductions in strength had to 
do with the "exhausted state of the military 
chest. "61 However, the stabilization of the 
Voltigeurs' 300 men did not accelerate 
recruitment. When the unit was inspected by 
Governor Prevost in the summer of 1812, it was 
still incomplete. Most of its officers were still 
out recruiting when Prevost ordered the general 
inspection. 62 By October 1812, the strength was 
only of 270 men. This only proved that 
recruitment problems were a terrible Achilles' 
heel for the unit. 63 Reforms in recruitment 
methods had to be introduced to attract men. 
De Salaberry understood this when he indicated 
in November 1812: "I am going to recruit as fast 
as possible and the officers have entered in an 
agreement to make up among ourselves the 
recruiting money to m7 -8-9 per men, in order 
to push on the recruiting."64 Governor Prevost 
later authorized de Salaberry to give an addition 
of 10 shillings on the bounty of every men 
recruited. Further, the Governor ordered that 
each new recruit be given 50 acres ofland, to be 
distributed after the war, in addition to the 
individual's financial bounty. 65 
This "bounty reform" was beneficial since 
de Salaberry recruited about 100 new men in 
late November alone. 66 Although many deserted, 
this increase was a sign that recruits actually 
sought bigger gratifications in order to join. 
Nevertheless, the Voltigeurs continued to grow 
in the subsequent months: from 320 men in 
January 1813, 67 to 393 in February68 and 438 
in March. 69 In only a few months, 168 new 
recruits were enrolled, increasing its strength 
by one third. 70 Hence, we can clearly see that 
French Canadians tended to join when 
gratifications were high enough. In a sense, they 
acted as war profiteers rather than highly 
motivated recruits who wished to prove their 
loyalty to the British authorities. 
The Voltigeurs, like most Lower Canada 
militia units, were predominantly French 
Canadian. However, many Anglophones served 
in its ranks. As Michelle Guitard found in her 
study, some 144 Anglophones saw active service 
with the Voltigeurs during the war. 71 In addition, 
the unit had to function in English because 
British military commands and maneuvers were 
given in English. This constituted a problem 
since many of the Voltigeurs officers and men 
29 
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did not understand nor speak English. 
Therefore, company orders had to be given in 
both languages. However, speaking French 
proved advantageous in battle. For example, 
during the Battle of the Chateauguay (26 October 
1813), de Salaberry and some ofhis officers gave 
their orders in French to ensure that the enemy 
would not comprehend them. 72 
Overall, more than 700 men served in the 
ranks of the Voltigeurs during the conflict. 73 It 
is interesting that most came from the colony's 
cities. According to historian Michelle Guitard, 
Montreal and Quebec city furnished 59.8 per 
cent of the total Voltigeurs corps. As she 
demonstrated, 344 of the 700 Voltigeurs were 
urbanites. This was impressive if we consider 
that only 25 per cent of Lower Canada's 
population was urban. 74 Perhaps this can explain 
the good proportion of anglophones who served 
with the unit during the war. 
To further increase the strength of the 
Voltigeurs, Governor Prevost began recruiting 
men of the Select 
Embodied Militia as of 
March 1813. Conscripts 
who were willing to 
extend their military 
service period were to be 
free from restrictions if 
they wished to volunteer 
in the Voltigeurs. Also, 
these new recruits were 
to receive the usual ce5 
bounty. Each Select and 
Embodied Militia 
Battalion was expected 
to furnish a maximum of 
25 men for the 
Voltigeurs. This was a 
radical measure, for it 
was illegal to do so 
according to the Militia 
Act. 75 Nevertheless, all of 
these measures 
strengthed the unit, 
which by late October 
1813 numbered 576 
men. 76 
proposed to the colonial authorities to convert 
the Voltigeurs into a "corps of regular troops." 
In other words, he hoped to transfer the 
Voltigeurs onto the British establishment as a 
regular regiment of infantry. The new unit was 
to consist of 480 men, who would all have 
enlisted for a service period of seven years. In 
the end, this project was refused by the 
authorities.77 Historian Michelle Guitard believes 
that this rejection was due to the changing 
European situation. With France having been 
defeated by Great Britain, British regular troops 
could now be sent to North America. With this 
in mind, converting the Voltigeurs into a regular 
British unit was no longer a necessity.78 
The Voltigeurs had a great reputation for 
discipline since De Salaberry was very strict and 
the corps was trained much like a regular 
regiment. 79 This may have been a doubled sword: 
too harsh for many and not hard enough to keep 
them in line. Mutinies, desertions, 
insubordination, and many other breeches of 
discipline were common to the Voltigeurs, as 
they were to other militia 
units. For example, on 
16 June 1812, the 
Voltigeurs camp in 
Chambly fell victim to a 
small mutiny when 
soldiers refused to obey 
orders. This small 
insurrection was caused 
by problems in the 
distribution of bread 
and pork, by rumors 
that the officers hoped to 
enroll the Voltigeurs as 
regulars and by the 
camp's lack of essential 
equipment such as beds 
for the barracks. 80 Upon 
receiving news of the 
mutiny, Governor 
Prevost reported his 
"extreme concern at the 
circumstance of 
insubordination in the 
Canadian Voltigeurs." He 
asked de Salaberry to 
order a Regimental 
Court Martial to judge 
the offenders. As Prevost 
So confident became 
de Salaberry of his unit's 
strength that in 1814, he 
30 
The Provincial Corps of Light 
Infantry (Canadian Voltigeurs); 
painting by Robert J. Marrion. 
CWM CN 75016 
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A detachment of Canadian Voltigeurs in pursuit of deserters, c.1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
indicated: "The men are to be convicted and 
sentenced to confinement and will be lodged in 
jail at Montreal."8 ' The Adjutant's Monthly Roll 
of the Canadian Voltigeurs Regiment for the 
month of June 1812 well demonstrated the 
importance of the mutiny, for 21 individuals were 
convicted by court martial. 82 The execution of 
this sentence proved two things; that disciplinary 
measures were to prevail and that the unit was 
not immune to the harsh reality of military 
insubordination. 83 
Desertion was probably the Voltigeurs worst 
problem during the War of 1812. Lepine found 
that there were 299 cases of desertion during 
the war: 87 in 1812; 99 in 1813; and 103 in 
1814. Considering that 700 men served with the 
unit during the war, this means that the desertion 
rate of the Voltigeurs was 42.7 per cent -
although some may have deserted many times. 84 
Many reasons can explain this high level of 
desertion. Attracted by bounties, recruits were 
often not ready for the hardships of military life 
and many deserted upon receiving their 
bounties.85 For many, military discipline and the 
"impersonal nature of military leadership" were 
frightening experiences. This perhaps explains 
why de Salaberry tried to learn the names of all 
of his men. As historian Patrick Wohler 
described; "His capacity for remembering names 
stood him good stead and helped to reduce the 
impersonal nature of military leadership which 
was always frightening to militiamen." Although 
this relaxed the stressful environment of military 
life, it did not stop men from deserting. 86 Also, 
the bare fact that Voltigeurs soldiers had to serve 
for the duration of the war, unlike normal 
militiamen, probably caused the greatest 
discontent. If we consider the annual proportion 
of deserters in Lepine's study, we can clearly see 
this as the number of deserters tends to increase 
as the war drags on. 
Homesickness was certainly a major 
incentive for desertion. Away from their families 
and with no easy means of communication, men 
often felt the desire to "visit" their relatives while 
on duty. As Colonel Lacroix of the Select 
Embodied Militia stated: "la plupart de ces 
jeunes gens 'n'ont pas reellement deserte,' mais 
sont partis 'voir leurs peres & meres comme des 
jeunes gens qui n'ont pas encore sorti."'87 
Further, since most militiamen were farmers, the 
long months of military service constituted a 
problem since nobody was running the farm in 
a society which depended on agriculture to 
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survive. 88 Although militiamen often sent their 
salaries to their wives, this was not enough to 
suffice the needs of their families. Hence, wives 
and children were in most cases without 
resources. Some cures even talked about the 
impoverishment of the families whose men were 
in the militia. 89 This situation probably drove 
many soldiers to desert and head back to their 
families. However, such "leaves of absence" were 
not accepted by the military authorities. As it 
was said: "deserter a sa femme, c'est deserter a 
l'ennemi."90 
Military life was not easy and this probably 
pushed many soldiers to desert. Troops were 
often subjected to both the pressures of war and 
the constraints of nature as they manned the 
front lines. This was especially true of the 
Voltigeurs. During operations, the unit was often 
positioned in swamps or in dense forests, waiting 
for the American invader. 91 Further, men were 
often subjected to bad weather, especially as they 
campaigned during the fall season. During 
operations in Autumn 1813, for instance, de 
Salaberry told that his troops had their "knees 
in mud and water" and were "drenched through 
with heavy rain. "92 Another example of exposure 
occurred in January 1814 as de Salaberry and 
a small force of Voltigeurs walked 65 kilometres 
in deep snow to reach Salmon River, an area the 
Americans were believed to attack. During this 
long march, the unit lost 30 men to frostbite. 93 
There are no doubts that such conditions 
deteriorated the morale and health of 
militiamen. 
The campaign of 1813 was the wors"t in 
terms of living conditions. This had to do with 
logistical problems in supplying de Salaberry's 
army which was stationed in the Chateauguay 
valley south of Montreal. The problem 
accentuated when Governor Prevost kept the 
army mobilized well into December. This meant 
that the force was subjected to winter 
temperatures. As a result, the health of the 
troops deteriorated as fevers and rheumatisms 
began to spread. 94 De Salaberry himself fell 
victim to rheumatism, experiencing "low fever 
and bowels complaints. "95 As a result, morale 
was at its lowest in 1813. Even de Salaberry's 
morale began to drop as he felt his corps being 
ill-treated by the Governor. De Salaberry even 
stated; "Tant qu'a mon regiment il Prevost doit 
bien sa voir les desagrements etemels que j'esuis 
avec eux, et qui si cela n'avait point ete pour rna 
fermete, il y a longtemps qu'il n'aurait plus de 
regiment Voltigeurs, ou pour mieux dire 
d'esclaves de l'armee. "96 His morale was so low 
that he told his father that he was thinking of 
resigning from the military. 97 According to de 
Salaberry, Prevost lost a lot of popularity among 
the troops. 98 
The desertion of Voltigeurs soldiers was 
accentuated by the fact that their unit operated 
on their own territory. Surrounded by a 
sympathetic population, deserters could easily 
Posting the night pickets, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
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find shelter in nearby homes or with local 
families. The billeting of deserters among locals 
became so common that de Monviel offered "une 
recompense de quatre piastres allouees a toute 
personne n'etant point en service actuel, qui 
arretera un deserteur de la milice incorporee et 
le conduira devant un jug e." The aim of such a 
measure was to stop this billeting of deserters. 99 
Further, any person found lodging a deserter was 
to be given a fine of 20 to 40 piastres. 100 
Desertion may also have plagued the 
Voltigeurs because, as a militia unit, it was not 
subjected to the same "iron discipline" as regular 
regiments. Militia punishments were less severe 
than those of the regular army, and cases of 
corporal punishment were rare. In fact, the 
discipline of militia units fell under Provincial 
Militia Laws instead of the British army's War 
Act or Mutiny Act. Hence, the punishment of a 
militiamen was not the same as a regular soldier. 
For instance, a regular soldier would be 
sentenced to 100 or 300 lashes for desertion 
while a militiamen would only be condemned to 
a few days in prison. 101 In fact, militia 
punishments for mutiny or desertion were 
similar. The offenders could be imprisoned for 
periods of two years and be subjected to 
extremely expensive fines. Also, they could be 
sentenced to forced labour, such as chopping 
wood, or working in the King's works. 102 In one 
such case, a militiaman who was court -martialed 
for starting a mutiny was sentenced to "payer 
dans les rangs du Premier Battaillon, les mains 
lies derriere le dos. Dela, il sera reconduit a la 
maison de correction la plus proche pour y etre 
detenu 9 mois et mploye a un travail dur apres 
quoi il sera reconduit a son bataillon pour y 
servir trois mois de plus que les autres 
miliciens."103 In other cases, mutineers were 
"conducted, handcuffed, to their battalion to ask 
pardon for their misbehavior on their knees, and 
to be confined afterwards in a cell of the 
Common Gaol of the district for three 
months. "104 Although some offenders were 
pardoned for desertion, most were sentenced 
to forced labour and solitary confinement. 105 One 
such example occurred in 1813 when a 
Voltigeurs deserter was sentenced to "four 
months labour in the King's works at Quebec, 
and to solitary confinement during the nights, 
after which he will be reconducted to his 
battalion, and will pass in the ranks, hand-
cuffed, and a log tied to his feet. "106 In another 
case, a deserter was sentenced to eight days 
solitary confinement, fed only with bread and 
water. 107 Although death was to be the ultimate 
punishment, it was never imposed on a 
militiamen. 108 These punishments proved how 
slack militia discipline really was. In almost no 
cases were offenders subject to corporal 
punishments or death. Deserters had nothing 
to lose in trying to escape. Therefore, this may 
explain why desertion was so high in the 
Voltigeurs during the war. Overall, there were 
more than 1,620 cases of desertion in Lower 
Canadian militia units during the war. 109 The 
authorities knew full well that drastic measures 
and corporal punishments would only bring 
opposition from the entire Lower-Canadian 
population. 110 
Other disciplinary problems had to do with 
the corps' disrespect of the local populace. 
Although militia regulations approved the 
quartering of troops in the houses or barns of 
local inhabitants, the men were to behave and 
were to respect the owners and their property. 
As regulations specified, no man was to take any 
"wood for fuel or provisions or in any way to 
injure or destroy the property of the inhabitants." 
Any soldiers who misbehaved were to be 
punished and to "make due compensation to the 
proprietor." 111 The problem was that such 
regulations were not respected. In the 
Chateauguay valley a lot of property was 
damaged by militiamen. Further, there were 
many cases of looting and foraging. Hence, the 
situation turned into a disciplinary problem. 
The lodging of troops during the war of 1812 
was problematic, especially on the front lines of 
the Chateauguay Valley, where the Voltigeurs 
were stationed. Since no barracks existed, the 
soldiers lived in small tents. However, since such 
facilities did not protect them from damp or cold 
weather, soldiers remained extremely dependent 
on the climate. 112 Since they were authorized by 
Militia Regulations to find shelter in the houses 
or barns of local residents, many militiamen 
exercised this right when weather was bad. 113 
Eventually, the quartering of troops on local 
properties led to some problems and 
exaggerations. For instance, one Joseph Primeau 
claimed that some 30 soldiers were quartered 
in his house during the war. 114 Other owners 
further claimed that their properties were used 
by militiamen for periods longer than 10 
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months. 115 In other cases, troops would use local 
farms to house and feed their horses. This was 
the case of an individual who claimed that 
Voltigeurs officers' horses were housed in his 
barns and stables. Further, the individual 
indicated that he had to feed the animals with 
his own corn, oat and hay. 116 
The quartering of troops on local farms often 
caused great damage. Houses and fumiture were 
broken, while the presence of soldiers in the 
fields often meant the destruction of crops. 
Troops stole farm produce and equipment to 
meet to their needs. In many cases, tools such 
as axes, saws and hammers were taken. 117 
Wooden fences and domestic firewood were 
taken to be burned. 118 Soldiers even stole two 
canoes at some point, which they used to 
transport provisions on the rivers. 119 There were 
many cases of unauthorized foraging, 120 as 
Voltigeurs looted corn, wheat, barley, oats, 
tobacco and vegetables , and stole chickens, pigs, 
sheep and even oxes. 121 At one point, troops stole 
a calf, two turkeys, 13 chickens, two potato 
pouches and some logs from one single farmer. 122 
Troops habitually took hay to feed their 
horses. 123 All this proved that some disciplinary 
problems existed in the Voltigeurs. 
Many of the problems of discipline and 
desertion in the Voltigeurs stemmed from the 
fact that they had a long and busy war, 
campaigning along the border with the US and 
even into Upper Canada. The aim of Governor 
Prevost was primarily to use the Voltigeurs, 
numerous militia battalions and some Indians 
as a defence force in the Chateauguay valley, 
south of Montreal. In charge of this small army 
of 1,200 men, de Salaberry told his father: "I 
am something of a bit of general. I have carte 
blanche from General de Rottenburg to act as 
occasion may require, without waiting for his 
orders. "124 This small army, 90 per cent French 
Canadians, defended the main corridor of 
invasion into Lower Canada 125 with no cavalry 
or artillery units in support. 126 
As a defensive force, de Salaberry and his 
men had to adopt defensive strategies and 
tactics. 127 Anticipating American invasions, as 
enemy units constantly assembled across the 
border, de Salaberry began to prepare his 
positions in the autumn of 1812. Knowing full 
well that his force was too small to fight a large 
American army, de Salaberry began resorting to 
34 
guerilla tactics. As a result, he kept his force 
constantly in movement along the front lines to 
keep American intelligence from knowing how 
small his force really was. 128 As historian 
Benjamin Suite described: "C'est un camp volant 
qui s'eparpillait, se rasseblait, prenait mille 
formes, etait partout, ne paraissait nulle part 
en une seule masse et faisait croire aux 
americains que c'etait l'avant-garde d'une armee 
solide."129 
Guerilla methods also meant frustrating the 
enemy. In that sense, scorched-earth policies 
were adopted. For instance, orders were given 
to destroy all bridges "for a distance of a league 
and a half in advance" of the army's positions. 130 
As Louis de Salaberry, father of Charles de 
Salaberry and commander of the 1st Battalion 
of the Select and Embodied Militia 131 told his 
wife in September 1812: "L'ordre est donne, et 
l'on commence demain a l'executer, pour rompre 
taus les pants d'ici aux lignes, gater, briser les 
chemins, les obstruer par des abbatis 
d'arbres .... Cela peut toujours retarder leur 
Americains marche. " 132 However, such 
operations also had their downsides, as Louis 
de Salaberry told his wife in another letter: "On 
acheve aujourd'hui de detruire les chemins, 
pants, chaussees. L'on a brule un tres beau pont 
et tout neuf. - C'est reellement grand damage 
qu'une telle destruction. Tout cela un ouvrage 
immense a reparer et coutera infiniment quand 
la paix reviendra. Mais la necessite, dit-on, ne 
connait plus de loi. Les habitants sont stupHaits 
de tout les ravages. "133 In some cases, scorched-
earth policies meant the burning and destruction 
of crops, as it occurred in the Chateauguay valley 
during the autumn of 1813. 134 
The Voltigeurs became reknown as great 
skirmishers and bush fighters. They understood 
guerilla warfare and used it to the best of their 
advantage. Historian Ronald L. Way well 
described this when he talked about how 
Voltigeurs elements operated during the battle 
at Chrysler's Farm in Upper Canada on 11 
November 1813, " ... they had skillfully utilized 
the cover of rocks, stumps, and fences and in 
their drab uniforms were almost invisible. "135 
Andrew Cochran, a Lower-Canadian bureaucrat, 
even wrote that French Canadians were superb 
guerilla fighters. 
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Canadian Voltigeurs getting ready for the morning inspection, c.1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
The fact is that the Canadians were competent 
to defend their own soil and they have the 
courage to do it. Few creatures can bear more 
hardships with less refraining than a Canadian 
- none can render a more ready obedience to 
what is required of them - none will be more 
persevering in what he undertake - and none 
are better calculated for the partisan warfare & 
bushfighting by which the progress of an enemy 
through that part of the country is to be checked 
than a Canadian farmer. 136 
During the war of 1812, the Voltigeurs fought 
numerous engagements, some in Upper Canada 
and even the United States. In the end, the unit 
fought at the battles of Salmon River (23 
November 1812), Sackett's Harbour (29 May 
1813), Chateauguay (26 October 1813), 
Chrysler's Farm (11 November 1813), 
Missisquoi Bay (26 March 1814), LaColle (30 
March 1814), Cape Vincent (14 May 1814), Lake 
Champlain (26 June 1814), Oddelltown (28 
June 1814), and Plattsburg (6-11 September 
1814 ). 137 Some Voltigeurs even served on the 
gunboats which patrolled the St. Lawrence and 
the Great Lakes to compensate for the lack of 
sailors. 138 Nevertheless, of all these battles, 
ChiHeauguay remained the most important and 
a major victory for French Canadians. 
In the Battle of the Chateauguay of 26 
October 1813, de Salaberry's little army 
neutralized an American invading army almost 
seven times its size. 139 At the time, de Salaberry's 
force numbered approximately 1, 700 men while 
the American army, under the command of 
General Wade Hampton, numbered 
approximately 5,500 men. Although both armies 
were considerable, only 2,000 Americans and 
300 Canadians actually fought, the rest were 
placed in reserve. 140 Outnumbered, de 
Salaberry's small force inflicted a crushing defeat 
on the American army using guerilla methods 
and skirmishing tactics. Overall, the Canadian 
force lost only five men while the Americans lost 
at least 50. 141 
The battle of Chateauguay became a symbol 
of French Canadian pride and a tool of 
nationalism. As the Gazette de Quebec observed 
in November 1813: 
L'Affaire pres de Ia ligne sur Ia riviere 
Chateauguay est Ia premiere ou il y ait eu un 
nombre considerable d'habitants du pays 
d'engages avec les Americains depuis le 
commencement de Ia guerre. Dans cette affaire 
notre force entiere, avec tres peu d'exceptions, 
depuis le commandant jusqu'au dernier etait des 
canadiens ... Ceci, aussi bien que d'avoir repousse 
l'ennemi, est une preuve evidente que nous avons 
de bans officiers et de bans soldats .. 
The Lower Canadian Legislative Assembly also 
recognized the importance of this victory when 
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Canadian Voltigeurs skirmishing in the woods, c. 1812-1813. Reconstruction by Eugene Leliepvre. 
it stated on 25 January 1814: "La Chambre 
reconnait sensiblement la valeur distinguee et 
la discipline qu'ont montrees les officiers non-
commisioned,- soldats et miliciens de la petite 
bande sous le commandement immediat du 
Lieutenant Colonel de Salaberry lors de I' action 
de Chateauguay."142 In one such letter to the King, 
the Assembly wrote: 
36 
Nous, les fideles sujets de Sa Majeste, les 
Communes du Bas Canada, ... supplions tres 
humblement qu'il plaise a votre altesse Royale 
de prendre en sa tres-gracieuse consideration 
les services que le Lieutenant Colonel Charles 
de Salaberry a rendus a son pays, tant par son 
habilete que par son courage, dans l'affaire 
glorieuse ... sur la riviere Chateauguay .... C'est 
pourquoi les fideles Communes de Sa Majeste 
supplient tres humblement votre altesse Royale 
de vouloir bien prendre en consideration ces 
services distingues, et pour inciter a l'avenir 
!'emulation de nos compatriotes pour la defence 
de cette province contre les ennemis de Sa 
Majeste .... Nous saisissons cette occasion pour 
renouveller a Votre Excellence !'expression de 
nos sentiments de gratitude pour a voir, par votre 
prudence, par la sagesse de vos mesures, et par 
votre habilete, conserve ces provinces 
importantes a l'Empire, et pour la sollicitude 
paternelle avec laquelle Votre Excellence a veille 
au bonheur des sujets de sa majeste, et pour 
prier Votre Excellence d'etre assuree que ces 
bienfaits resteront pour toujours profondement 
graves dans le coeur canadiens.' 43 
This French Canadian pride in the victory 
of Chateauguay was further propagated in 
French Canadian nationalist historiography. In 
this "myth ofChateauguay," de Salaberrywas a 
hero and the Voltigeurs symbols of French 
Canadian participation in the war. The whole 
affair became a source of intense nationalism. 
For example, in his Histoire de la Milice 
Canadienne Fran{:aise (1897), Benjamin Suite 
wrote: "Parmi les actions remarquables de cette 
guerre, nous choisissons de preference celles ou 
les Canadiens Franyais ant brille Chateauguay, 
pour faire comprendre au lecteur que notre 
element a accompli son devoir en conscience, 
durant ce conflit ou l'on craignait de nous voir 
engager, par suite de fausses impressions 
rependues sur notre compte, grace a une 
certaine ecole de politiciens. "144 Even the clergy 
used the Battle of Chateauguay as a nationalist 
tool. In his Histoire du Canada, C.S. Viator 
wrote in 1915 that the battle "prouva surtout la 
loyaute et le patriotisme des Canadiens 
Franyais. "145 However, no historian or writer can 
compare with historian Thomas Chapais, who 
wrote in his Cours d'histoire du Canada, II: 
"Chateauguay ... Ce fut essentiellement une 
victoire canadienne-franyaise. Elle est bien a 
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nous et personne ne peut nous la ravir ... 
Chateauguay, c'etait notre vengeance. 
Chateauguay, c'etait notre indeniable loyalisme 
et de notre patriotisme ardent. "146 
While it lifted French Canadian spirits, the 
Battle of the Chateauguay also proved to British 
authorities that French Canadians were not 
"silent enemies" of Britain, nor were they 
potential traitors. It had proved that 
francophones were willing to defend their 
"homeland" just as much as the anglophones. 
Governor Prevost was to first to recognize the 
importance of French Canadian participation in 
the War of 1812. The General Orders of the 
Militia of 27 October 1813 well demonstrated 
Prevost's gratitude towards French Canadians: 
Son Excellence, le Gouverneur en chef et 
commandant des forces ... se fait un devoir et un 
plaisir de payer le tribut d'eloge qui est si 
justement du au ... Lt. Colonel De Salaberry pour 
sa conduite judicieuse et digne d'un officier ... 
Son Excellence doit encore les plus grands eloges 
a toutes les troupes de cette station, pour leur 
confiance, leur discipline. et leur patience a 
endurer les fatigues et les privations qu'elles ont 
eprouvees. Leur determination a perseverer 
dans cette conduite honorable ne peut manquer 
d'assurer la victoire aux braves et loyaux 
Canadiens, et de jetter le trouble et la confusion 
dans le coeur de l'ennemi, s'il pensait souiller 
de sa presence cet heureux pays. 147 
Governor Prevost also noted on November 4, 
1813: 
His Excellency the Governor in chief and 
Commander of the forces, has the highest pride 
and satisfaction in declaring His 
acknowledgemnt to the loyal and brave Militia 
of Lower Canada, for the zeal and alacrity with 
which they flew to their posts, and for the 
patience and firmness with which they have 
endured, in this inclement season, the severe 
hardships and privations to which they have 
been exposed; the steadiness and discipline of 
the whole have been conspicuous; and the 
undaunted gallantry displayed by six companies, 
almost to a man, composed of Canadian 
Fencibles and Militia, under the immediate 
command ofLieut.-Col. de Salaberry, in repelling 
with disgrace, an American invading army, 
twenty times their numbers, reflects unfading 
honor on the Canadian name. 148 
King George III acknowledged French 
Canadian participation in the war effort and the 
Battle of Chateauguay. His comments were 
presented in the General Orders of the Militia 
on 26 March 1814: 
Son Altesse Royale a observe avec la plus grande 
satisfaction l'habilete et la bravoure qui ont paru 
dans les officiers et les hommes qui composaient 
le detachement de troupes opposees a l'Armee 
du General Hampton. La resistance qu'elles ont 
opposee avec succes a un ennemi aussi 
disproportionne a abattu la confiance de 
l'ennemi, deconcerte ses plans, eta mis en surete 
cette partie des frontieres canadiennes. Son 
Altesse Royale voit avec un plaisir particulier que 
les sujets canadiens de Sa Majeste ont eu enfin 
!'occasion (que son Altesse Royale desirait 
depuis longtemps leur etre procuree) de refuter 
par leurs propres glorieux efforts pour la defence 
de leurs pays, les accusation calomnieuses de 
desaffection et de deloyaute que l'ennemi avait 
avancees avant sa premiere invasion de Ia 
province ... Vous ne manquerez pas d'exprimer 
au Lieut. Colonel De Salaberry en particulier, et 
a tous les officiers et hommes sous son 
commandement, en general, la tres-gracieuse 
approbation de son Altesse Royale de leurs 
services meritoires et distingues. Son Altesse 
Royale vous envoye, par la premiere occasion 
sure, les Drapeaux que vous avez sollicites pour 
les Bataillons de Milice Incorporee, sentant qu'ils 
ont montre une habilete et une disposition a les 
defendre d'insulte, qui leur donnent le meilleur 
titre a une pareille marque de distinction149 
It is ironic to note that the authorities believed 
that the French Canadian participation in the 
War of 1812 was a perfect example of their 
"loyalty" to the British Crown. "Loyalty" was 
perhaps a strong word. As Jean-Pierre Wallot 
indicated: "Ce qui motive d'abord les Canadiens 
en 1812, c'est la 'fidelite a eux-memes', 'la 
resolutions toujours la meme de rester dans leur 
pays et d'avoir une vie a eux."'~ 5° French 
Canadians were more inclined to fight for their 
own interests than those of the British crown, 
and in this they resembled most other colonial 
militias in 18th century North America. As 
author Rene Chartrand described when quoting 
a British officer: "perhaps they did not love the 
English Government or people, but they loved 
the Americans less. "151 
Fernand Ouellet agrees, "Laguerre cree un 
danger exterieur auquel toutes les classes de la 
societe sont eminemment sensibles. L'Americain, 
ce n'est pas seulement l'envahisseur, c'est le 
porteur de valeurs que le milieu canadien-
franc;ais rejette." 152 Ouellet further specified that 
French Canadians fought because they feared 
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that American commercial and industrial 
capitalism, combined with the ideologies of 
Republicanism and Democracy, might 
destabilize, if not destroy, the economic and 
social infrastructure of French Canada. 153 
Feeling threatened by the American invader, the 
security of Great Britain was perceived as the 
only means to defend their interests. For many 
French Canadians, "la puissance maritime et 
militaire de l'Angleterrre procure a la fois 
securite et reconfort aux coloniaux. "154 
Nevertheless, the War of 1812 led the British 
authorities to be somewhat more tolerant, for a 
time, of their French Canadian subjects. 
The War of 1812 came to an end on 
Christmas eve 1814 with the signing of the Treaty 
of Ghent. As a result, both Great Britain and 
the United states accepted the status quo ante 
bellum. 155 With the hostilities over, the Voltigeurs 
were disbanded on 15 March 1815. 156 With the 
disbandment of the unit came the end of a proud 
regiment. but one which had created a rich and 
enduring legacy for French Canada. 
The Voltigeurs proved to be good fighters, 
and their victory at Chateauguay was a fine 
example of their efficiency in combat. For French 
Canadians, Chateauguay also became a symbol 
of pride, and it convinced British authorities that 
French Canadians were not "disloyal" subjects. 
Therefore, despite all the problems encountered 
by the Voltigeurs during their existence, they 
made an important contribution to colonial 
defence, and a lasting impression on French 
Canadian self-esteem. 
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